Another Time, Another Place: The Truth of Silence in J.M. Coetzee\u27s Disgrace by Murphy, Sara T
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
Theses and Dissertations Hunter College 
Summer 8-13-2021 
Another Time, Another Place: The Truth of Silence in J.M. 
Coetzee's Disgrace 
Sara T. Murphy 
CUNY Hunter College 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/hc_sas_etds/781 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 





Another Time, Another Place: The Truth of Silence in J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace 
by 
Sara Murphy 
Submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts (English), Hunter College 
The City University of New York 
2021 
         Thesis Sponsor:  
 
 
August 13, 2021 
___________________________    ___________________________  
 Date        Signature of Sponsor    
         Professor Jeremy Glick  
 
 
August 13, 2021 
___________________________    ___________________________  
 Date        Signature of Second Reader   





[M]y own problem has always been the question of truth, of telling 
the truth, the wahr-sagen—what it is to tell the truth—and the 
relation between “telling the truth” and forms of reflexivity, of self 
upon self.” (Barrett quoting Foucault 141)  
 
In another time, in another place it might be held to be a public 
matter. But in this place, at this time, it is not. It is my business, 
mine alone.’ 
‘This place being what?’ 
‘This place being South Africa.’ (Coetzee 122) 
  
 In J.M. Coetzee’s novel Disgrace, the two main characters arrive at an impasse when 
Lucy Lurie refuses to tell the police that she was raped despite her father’s urging. Using  
Foucault’s theory of the production of truth, I will examine what Lucy’s silence represents in 
terms of truth and justice. I pose that in remaining silent following her rape, Lucy does not solely 
atone for the crimes of white South Africans during Apartheid, but also for the apathy of average 
citizens that sustained a racist and oppressive regime. Through Lucy’s rejection of the criminal 
justice system, the novel operates as an allegory for the failure of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission to provide individual justice and reparations to victims of Apartheid. By the close 
of the novel, her negotiated position in Petrus’s household serves as a voluntary act of radical 
reparation for her own past complicity. 
Published in 1999 and set in post-Apartheid South Africa, Disgrace follows David Lurie, 
a white professor in Cape Town who loses his job after sexually assaulting one of his students. 
Unwilling to fully participate in his university’s disciplinary process, David is dismissed from his 
position and leaves Cape Town for an extended stay with his daughter, Lucy, a single woman 
who owns a farm and rescues stray dogs in the Eastern Cape. While there, they are victims of a 
heinous attack at the hands of three black men who break in, beat David, gang rape Lucy, shoot 
her dogs, and steal their car. While Lucy reports the theft, she is unwilling, despite David’s 
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repeated pleas, to report her rape to the police. When she subsequently becomes pregnant, she 
decides to carry out her pregnancy, and marry Petrus, the black man who works on her farm and 
may have aided her rapists. She signs over her farm and the paternity of her future child to Petrus 
in exchange for his protection in order to remain in her home. Meanwhile David, exiled from his 
Cape Town life and humiliated by his daughter’s decision, resorts to working with a local 
woman who nurses and euthanizes sick dogs.  
The novel examines power on micro- and macro- levels by disrupting the power relations 
among individual characters against the backdrop of a nation emerging from a period of extreme 
systemic oppression. Coetzee highlights the tenuous relationship between truth and justice 
through Lucy’s refusal to report her rape to the police and pursue a criminal justice remedy. 
Coetzee foregrounds her decision with David’s purported reliance on the law during his refusal 
to provide a public apology for his abuse of power. Through the characters’ unsatisfying 
experiences with varied systems of justice, the novel offers an indictment of South Africa’s 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which was widely deemed to have failed in its objective 
of providing justice to black South Africans, justice that was promised in exchange for truth in 
the form of public testimony. Thus, Coetzee reveals the tenuous nature of the truth and the 
illusory promise of justice that truth has come to represent in modern legal discourse as the 
characters grapple with a legal system that often produces truth at the expense of justice.  
 
 
The Production of Truth 
 Michel Foucault once described his life’s work as examining “the effects of power and 
the production of ‘truth;’” thus, his concepts of power and truth are the starting point of my 
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analysis (“Order of Discourse” 55).  His concept of power differed from the traditionally held 
view of something centralized and oppressive. He saw power not as an oppressive force 
possessed and exercised by a central sovereign entity, such as a head of state or institution, but 
rather as something fluid, temporal and changing; something which exists in a system of 
relationships. 
[P]ower must be understood. . . as the multiplicity of force 
relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which 
constitute their own organization; as the processes which, through 
the ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, 
or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in 
one another, thus forming a chain or system, or on the contrary, the 
disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one 
another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, 
whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in 
the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various 
social hegemonies. Power’s condition of possibility…must not be 
sought in the primary existence of a central point, in a unique 
source of sovereignty…it is the moving substrate of force relations 
which…constantly engender states of power, but the latter are 
always local and unstable….The omnipresence of power: not 
because it has the privilege of consolidating everything under its 
invincible unity, but because it is produced from one moment to 
the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point 
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to another. Power is everywhere; not because it embraces 
everything, but because it comes from everywhere. (History of 
Sexuality, 92-93) 
This lengthy explanation from The History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction, is typically 
Foucauldian in that it defines what it is not as much as what it is. Yet it is central to 
understanding how Foucault rejected the notion of power as something centralized and 
oppressive. According to social theorist and Foucauldian scholar Michèle Barrett, power works 
in what he termed “micro” operations: strategies and technologies of power (Barrett 134). Thus, 
power is exercised rather than possessed, and its effects can be understood by examining power 
relations, or technologies of power (Barrett 136). Foucault saw the structure of power relations as 
an enveloping web of capillaries rather than binary oppositions: multiple threads of power 
relations in his model, no longer clearly oppositional, that become more ambiguous and diverse 
while the possibilities multiply. Power permeates the social body, leaving no space, and no 
being, which is not constituted by its operation.    
 Driving his study of the effects of power, which result in the production of truth, was his 
interest in the how, rather than the what or the why: how is it that a certain statement appeared, 
and how is it that the truth is given a certain value (Barrett 136)? Foucault examined how power 
operated to create the very questions he posed; the methods, strategies, shifting effects and 
implications of power begged examination in a variety of discourses, including, or in particular, 
the political and economic. It was only by considering the “how” of power relations that the 
what, who, and why of the exercise of power could be understood.  
 At the crux of Lucy and David’s disagreement about her decision to remain silent is their 
differing views of what it means to tell the truth in a legal context. Foucault once stated, “my 
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own problem has always been the question of truth, of telling the truth, the wahr-sagen—what it 
is to tell the truth—and the relation between “telling the truth” and forms of reflexivity, of self 
upon self” (Barrett quoting Foucault 141). This relationship between truth, knowledge, and 
power, known as the “savoir pouvoir,” holds the key to how truth is produced within a discourse.  
In Foucault’s lecture “The Order of Discourse,” he names three “exclusions which forge 
discourse” in post-medieval western society and lead to the formation of knowledge statements 
within discourses (“Order of Discourse” 52-55). The first of these are prohibitions such as those 
on “what we can speak about, on who may speak and when,” which interact with varying 
controls and exclusions that such that discourse becomes “not simply a translation of domination 
into language, but is itself a power to be seized” (“Order of Discourse” 52). This is particularly 
apparent in sexuality and politics, where the constraints on the objects of discourse and who may 
make knowledge statements within the discourse lead to a web of multiple controls and 
exclusions (52).    
 Another of Foucault’s exclusions useful to this discussion is “the will to know or will to 
truth[,]…involving a shift from seeing truth as a given property of the discourse of those in 
power to seeing truth as a property of the referent of discourse” (“Order of Discourse” 55). Since 
the referent is the subject of the discourse, truth becomes a property of the object or discipline 
that the discourse concerns. The disciplines take a role in the management of truth. As an 
example, Foucault used modern legal discourse, which seemed in his view to have replaced 
justice with the “truths” established by the accepted knowledge of the sociological and medical 
disciplines as its justification (“Order of Discourse” 55): “It is as if even the work of law could 
no longer be authorised, in our society, except by a discourse of truth” (Barrett 143).  
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 When the “will to truth” is defined and reinforced by the practices and institutions of the 
various disciplines within a discourse, it leaves the possibility for there to be truths and 
discoveries dismissed or unacknowledged because they fall beyond the boundaries of the 
discourse. The “will to truth” becomes self-reinforcing: 
Mendel spoke the truth, but he was not ‘within the true’ of the 
biological discourse of his time….Within its own limits, each 
discipline recognizes true and false propositions; but it pushes back 
a whole teratology of knowledge beyond its margins….It is always 
possible that one might speak the truth in the space of a wild 
exteriority, but one is “in the true” only by obeying the rules of a 
discursive “policing” which one has to reactivate in each of one’s 
discourses. (“Order of Discourse” 60-61) 
If truth, then, is determined by the discourse, its reliability comes into question as the possibility 
exists that it may not encompass all of the knowledge that exists at the time, but only that 
knowledge accepted within the controlling disciplines. Situations may arise in which a “truth” 
may be beyond the boundaries of thought in a given discourse—in the space of a “wild 
exteriority”—and therefore not “within the true” (or within the “will to truth”) under the rules of 
the current discourse (“Order of Discourse” 61). Foucault questioned the processes by which 
effects of truth are secured in disciplines which acknowledge certain truths but reject or repress 
deviations of truths which fall beyond the margins of the discourse (Barrett 143). 
 Speech and silence become intricately intertwined with this notion of truth. Foucault 
posed the question, “why in fact, are we attached to the truth?...[H]ow is it, in our societies, ‘the 
truth’ has been given this value, this placing us absolutely under its thrall?” (“Order of 
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Discourse” 61). Disgrace shows how our attachment to truth in legal discourse has usurped our 
attachment to justice. Truth is accepted as the prerequisite for justice, causing an endless 
production of “truth”—through confession, sworn testimony, fact-finding, evidence—despite the 
fact that justice often remains elusive.  
 
Truth in Disgrace  
In Disgrace, after the attack on the farm during which Lucy is raped, David begs her to report it 
to the police. She reports the robbery and assault to the authorities so that she may collect 
insurance money, but she refuses to report the rape. Initially, she does not even tell David that 
she was raped; he surmises it from her behavior after the attack. Likewise, David does not speak 
of it directly to her; he speaks in fits and starts around the subject of the sexual assault, his very 
voice failing him, his speech interspersed with pauses and silences.  
‘David, when people ask, would you mind keeping to your own 
story, to what happened to you?’ 
He does not understand.   
‘You tell what happened to you, I tell what happened to me,’ she 
repeats. 
“You’re making a mistake,’ he says in a voice that is fast 
descending to a croak. 
‘No I’m not,’ she says. (Coetzee 99)  
* 
(David) ‘What are you going to tell the owners?’ 
‘I’ll tell them the truth.’ 
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‘Will your insurance cover it?’ 
‘I don’t know. I don’t know whether insurance policies cover 
massacres. I will have to find out.’ 
A pause. ‘Why aren’t you telling the whole story, Lucy?’ 
‘I have told the whole story. The whole story is what I have told.’   
He shakes his head dubiously. (Coetzee 110) 
 
David refers to Lucy’s omission of the rape in her report as “an untruth” (Coetzee 108). He 
explains his desire for her to report the rape as a desire for justice: “I want those men to be 
caught and brought before the law and punished. Am I wrong? Am I wrong to want justice?” 
(Coetzee 119).   
David assumes that if Lucy goes public about her rape by filing a report, then justice 
under the criminal justice system will result: presumably, the perpetrators will be caught, 
charged, tried, and imprisoned. Yet he fails to consider what this type of justice would look like 
from Lucy’s point of view. The crime of rape itself cannot be restituted: money collected from 
an insurance claim can be used to purchase a new car, but there is no restitution for rape. When 
David will not relent, Lucy tries to explain her reasoning: 
‘This has nothing to do with you, David. You want to know why I 
have not laid a particular charge with the police. I will tell you, as 
long as you agree not to raise the subject again. The reason is that, 
as far as I am concerned, what happened to me is a purely private 
matter. In another time, in another place it might be held to be a 
public matter. But in this place, at this time, it is not. It is my 
business, mine alone.’ 
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‘This place being what?’ 
‘This place being South Africa. (Coetzee 112) 
 
David sees Lucy as failing to tell the truth, and in turns sees this failure as a waiver of the 
possibility of justice. Yet Lucy does not see it as a public matter. Her claim that it is a private 
matter “in this place, at this time” reveals her awareness that once spoken, her accusation will be 
taken as truth, and it will set in motion an entire mechanism, a.k.a. a “justice system” that 
operates punitively against criminals such as her rapists (Coetzee 112). Her decision to remain 
silent regarding her rape is an affirmative decision to not to act in the particular way that David 
wants her to, and a rejection of the notion of a singular objective truth that triggers justice.    
Additionally, as noted by Frances Ferguson in her essay Rape and the Rise of the Novel, 
rape is the only crime that is solely constituted by the lack of the victim’s consent (91). Were 
Lucy to report her rape, her speech would become an element of the crime: she can only prove 
that she did not consent to sexual relations by saying so. Lacking any physical evidence that 
presumably has disappeared due to her delay, the only evidence she could provide of the crime is 
her private absence of speech (her lack of consent) and her public speech (her allegation). She 
can only seek justice through public means, whereby she must publicly testify about her private 
silence. “What is said in public must be proved, while what is said in private must be believed” 
(Ferguson 99). 
 Using Foucault’s premise that an individual is constituted by power relations, Lucy is 
constituted by her race (white), her gender (female), and her class (landowner) in post-Apartheid 
South Africa. Her rapists are likewise black, male, and while the novel does not specify, 
presumably landless and poor, men who have suffered under an institutionalized system of 
injustice for decades. Because of these specific dynamics, Lucy is in a public position of power, 
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and therefore her speech will likely be taken as truth. Yet historically this has not been the case, 
as it is often a woman’s perceived weakness that boosts the credibility of her accusation, by 
appearing powerless that she is believed to have been victimized (Ferguson 97). Or as Ferguson 
puts it, “her very lack of power guarantees her truthfulness; her not counting makes her words 
count” (97).  
Lucy describes her rapists as men who “do rape,” comparing them to a pack of dogs: 
‘I think they have done it before,’ she resumes, her voice steadier 
now. ‘At least the two older ones have. I think they are rapists first 
and foremost. Stealing things is just incidental. A side-line. I think 
they do rape.’ 
‘You think they will come back?’ 
‘I think I am in their territory. They have marked me. They will 
come back for me.’  
‘Then you can’t possibly stay.’ 
‘Why not?’ 
‘Because that would be an invitation to them to return.’ 
She broods a long while before she answers. ‘But isn’t there 
another way of looking at it, David? What if…what if that is the 
price one has to pay for staying on? Perhaps that is how they look 
at it; perhaps that is how I should look at it too. They see me as 
owing something. They see themselves as debt collectors, tax 
collectors. Why should I be allowed to live here without paying? 




Once (and if) one gets beyond the unsettling racism of this analogy, I propose that Lucy is posing 
the Foucauldian question how? How did this crime come to be committed by these men against 
her, as individuals constituted by their power relations? How did they come to be men who “do 
rape”? She knows that if she reports the crime, the operative legal system will imprison the 
individual rapists, but it will not stop men who “do rape” “in this time, this place”: post-
Apartheid South Africa. She is traumatized not only by the violence done to her, but by the hate 
that her perpetrators carried for her. She is both destroyed and compelled by the realization that 
these men are the products of the very power relations that have privileged her throughout her 
life.  
Consequently, when Lucy ponders “what if that is the price one has to pay for staying 
on,” the “that” in question is not necessarily her rape, but her silence in its aftermath. Lucy’s 
choice to remain silent about her rape is not an “untruth,” as David suggests, nor is it a denial of 
justice where the legal system only reinforces the current power relations. In this regard the 
novel serves as a critique of a criminal justice system that offers limited forms of justice for 
individual crimes while reinforcing systemic racism through the imprisonment of primarily black 
people. Lucy’s silence becomes a truth that exists in the “wild exteriority” of the legal discourse, 
as it creates a different history of the present by acknowledging the oppression that contributed 
not only to her individual rape, but to the existence of men who, as she observes, “do rape.” In 
this way the novel serves as an allegory for another deficient system of justice—the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”)—which abandoned individual justice in favor of a form of 
collective justice that failed to account for the circumstances that drove people to commit crimes 




The Truth and Reconciliation Commission  
Established in 1995, the TRC provided a public forum for citizens to give testimony 
regarding human rights abuses committed during the Apartheid era with the aim of advancing 
nationwide healing. It gave South Africans the opportunity to confess to their own crimes, to 
testify regarding crimes committed by others, to express regret for failing to prevent abuses, and 
to demonstrate commitment to reconciliation. Unlike an international criminal court or tribunal, 
where people are tried and can be sentenced for crimes, there was no punitive mechanism of the 
TRC. Nor was the Commission empowered with the ability to mandate restitution or reparations; 
reconciliation was its sole directive. Perhaps its very name should have portended its eventual 
impotence: it was, after all, not titled “Truth and Reparation,” nor even “Truth and Justice.” The 
Report of the TRC (“the Report”) was presented to President Nelson Mandela on October 29, 
1998. 
The TRC eliminated the restriction that only state actors could be held accountable for 
human rights violations. This controversial decision eliminated the just war defense, as it meant 
that those fighting against Apartheid could be found equally guilty of human rights abuses as 
their oppressors under Apartheid. As Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the TRC Chairperson, wrote in 
the Foreword to the Report:  
Some have criticized us because they believe we talk of some acts 
as morally justifiable and others not. Let us quickly state that the 
section of the act relating to what constitutes a gross violation of 
human rights makes no moral distinction—it does not deal with 
morality. It deals with legality. A gross violation is a gross 
violation, whoever commits it and for whatever reason. There is 
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thus legal equivalence between all perpetrators. Their political 
affiliation is irrelevant. If an ANC member tortures someone, that 
is a gross violation of the victim’s rights. If a National Party 
member or a police officer tortures a prisoner, then that is a gross 
violation of the prisoner’s rights. (“Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of South Africa Report” 12-13) 
This established a false equivalency between the oppressors and the oppressed, as there was no 
distinction among abuses by either side, and no immunity or proportionality for the latter. While 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (“the Report”) acknowledged 
that the system of Apartheid itself was a crime against humanity at a systemic level, acts carried 
out by people on either side of the conflict were classified as human rights violations. Thus, the 
Foucauldian question “how” was not addressed: how opponents of Apartheid came to commit 
human rights abuses in the struggle for justice was not considered. By spreading accountability 
too wide, the TRC diluted its potential impact, as the focus shifted from atrocities committed by 
the state and its supporters in furtherance of an abusive and racist system, to individual acts 
committed by people on both sides of an inherently imbalanced and unjust system. It rendered 
South Africa a nation of victims and perpetrators for whom individual justice was unattainable.  
Lucy’s silence following her rape operates as a representation of the limitation that was 
built into the TRC whereby truthful testimony was encouraged and produced but did not result in 
justice. It suggests that South Africans were misguided by the performative form of legal 
recourse offered by the TRC. In creating a false equivalency between the perpetrators of 
Apartheid and those who were fighting against Apartheid, the TRC failed to address the deep-
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seated and systemic racism—the very source of the hate that Lucy notes—at the root of the 
multitude of abuses suffered by black South Africans. 
 
 
Silence as Power  
Coetzee uses silence throughout the novel regarding Lucy’s sexuality. While David 
suspects Lucy is a lesbian who previously had a female partner, they never discuss it, so he 
remains curious about it: “Helen is a large, sad-looking woman with a deep voice and bad skin, 
older than Lucy. He has never been able to understand what Lucy sees in her” (Coetzee 60).  He 
is also somewhat repelled by what he views as Lucy’s decreasing sexual attractiveness:  
“A year has passed, and she has put on weight. Her hips  and 
breasts are now (he searches for the best word) ample….Now here 
she is, flowered dress, bare feet and all, in a house full of the smell 
of baking, no longer a child playing at farming but a 
countrywoman, a boervrou.” (Coetzee 60)  
Upon discovering her pregnancy, when Lucy states that she will not go through with an abortion 
again, David is further frustrated that Lucy never speaks about her sexual orientation or activity. 
Yet by refusing to verbalize, to “confess,” her sexuality—including her partners and her 
reproductive decisions—Lucy has been able to run her farm and employ Petrus without 
compromising her power relations by defining herself through a public admission. In remaining 




In the History of Sexuality Vol. 1, Foucault relies upon the principles of exclusion of what 
he calls the “repressive hypothesis” regarding sexuality. He states that the will to knowledge, 
rather than the truth about sex (or the lies used to conceal the truth about sex), has not been 
halted by the “repressive hypothesis”; rather the technologies of power bring out the “will to 
knowledge” (11-12). In examining sex as a discursive fact, or a statement that exists within a 
discourse, Foucault considers who does the speaking, including from which positions and 
viewpoints they speak, and how the forms of power permeate the various discourses through 
various technologies of power (History of Sexuality Vol. 1, 11). Rather than look to determine 
whether the effects of this power lead to the truth about sex, or to lies designed to hide the truth, 
he looks to identify the “will to knowledge” that serves to support and enact the discursive 
productions: 
There is not one but many silences, and they are an integral part of 
the strategies that underlie and permeate discourses. [S]ilence 
itself…is less the absolute limit of discourse….[I]t functions 
alongside the things said, with them and in relation to them. [W]e 
must try to determine the different ways of not saying such things, 
and how those who can and those who cannot speak of them are 
distributed, which type of discourse is authorized, or which form of 
discretion is required in either case. (History of Sexuality Vol. 1, 
27). 
Foucault does not deny that there is truth, or falsehood used to repress truth, regarding sex that 
may fall outside these boundaries; but the technologies of power control the discourse—through 
controlling those who speak, those who store and disseminate information, the topics that are 
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spoken about, and a myriad of other ways—such that only within the will to knowledge is the 
truth produced (History of Sexuality Vol. 1, 27). Foucault traces how sexuality came to be 
controlled by confession: rather than seek forgiveness for sexual acts deemed abnormal or illicit, 
the Church mandated that people seek contrition for sexual thoughts; in this way, the institution 
forced people to speak their thoughts and desires about sex, making them easier to monitor, 
manipulate, and control (History of Sexuality Vol.  1, 38-44).  
Lucy’s refusal to speak of her sexuality and of her sexual assault is an assertion of power 
and an affirmative means of maintaining control over it, of keeping it from becoming a public 
matter and subject to the public discourse. It is an acknowledgement that the discourse itself is a 
form of power; once Lucy speaks of her assault, she would cede control over it, over both the 
truth of its occurrence, as well as the form of “justice” she desires. The legal and social discourse 
requires Lucy to “confess” or “speak,” but she justifies her refusal to do so with the defense that 
these things are private. By invoking her right to privacy, she maintains her power. 
 
Fiction as Truth  
Disgrace provoked very strong reactions when released, including much criticism. South 
African novelist Nadine Gordimer stated, “in the novel Disgrace there is not one black person 
who is a real human being” (Donadio). South Africa’s President at the time, Thabo Mbeki, 
referred to the depiction of blacks in the novel as stereotypical and one-sided, made out to be 
largely violent and amoral and depicting South Africa as a “country of rape” (Coleman). One 
year later the very political party he led, the African National Congress, appeared to disregard 
the fact that the book is a work of fiction. At the 2000 Human Rights Commission Hearings on 
Racism in the Media, it relied on the novel as proof of “white fear” permeating the country and 
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controlling the media representation of post-Apartheid South Africa. On behalf of the ANC, 
Minister Jeff Radebe quoted specific passages from the novel before explaining:  
In the novel, J.M. Coetzee represents as brutally as he can, the 
white people’s perception of the post-apartheid black man. This is 
Hertzog’s savage eight-year-old, without the restraining leash 
around his neck that the European had been obliged to place, in the 
interest of both the native and society. It is suggested that in these 
circumstances, it might be better that our white compatriots should 
emigrate because to be in post-apartheid South Africa is to be in 
‘their territory’, as a consequence of which the whites will lose 
their cards, their weapons, their property, their rights, their dignity. 
The white women will have to sleep with the barbaric black men. 
Accordingly, the alleged white “brain drain” must be reportedly 
(sic) regularly and given the necessary prominence! 
J.M. Coetzee makes the point that, five years after our 
liberation, white South African society continues to believe in a 
particular stereotype of the African, which defines the latter as: 
- immoral and amoral; 
- savage; 
- violent; 
- disrespectful of private property; 
- incapable of refinement through education; and, 
- driven by hereditary dark, satanic impulses. 
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To understand the phenomenon of racism in our media, we 
must start from this basic point—that many practitioners of 
journalism in our country (including the foreign correspondents) 
carry this stereotype in their heads at all times.  
In this bizarre twist, the ANC used Coetzee’s work of fiction, the very work it had criticized,  as 
evidence of white South Africans’ fears of blacks, citing it as proof that stereotypes of black 
people were rampant and responsible for biased media coverage in the country. While 
acknowledging the book as a “novel,” he proceeded to discuss it as if offering facts in evidence, 
as if it were a sociological study or work of nonfiction. The novel itself became a technology of 
power, used to produce “truth” to further the ANC’s specific aims. 
 It is ironic then that Disgrace represents the illusory link between truth and justice. This 
is clearest when contrasting the reactions of Lucy following her assault to that of David 
following his assault on a university student. After an account of David’s affair with and 
harassment of (without mention of the assault on) his student Melanie is reported in the 
newspaper, David faces a university disciplinary hearing. The hearing is extra-legal; no criminal 
charges are ever brought against him, and he merely faces a committee of his professional peers 
regarding the alleged violation of the student’s human rights. Upon hearing the charges against 
him, David immediately states, “I plead guilty to both charges. Pass sentence, and let us get on 
with our lives” (Coetzee 48). But when pushed to provide his side of the story, he gives the 
following statement:  
‘Very well,’ he says, ‘let me confess. The story being one evening, 
I forget the date, but not long past. I was walking through the old 
college gardens and so, it happened, was the young woman in 
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question, Ms. Isaacs. Our paths crossed. Words passed between us, 
and at that moment something happened which, not being a poet, I 
will not try to describe. Suffice it to say that Eros entered. After 
that I was not the same.’ (Coetzee 52) 
David’s “confession” is completely devoid of the very “facts” on which he purportedly wants to 
rely. His testimony is a mockery of the system intended to elicit truth statements: he provides no 
time, no date, no testimony, no witnesses. He is unwilling to even articulate the word “abuse” 
with which he is charged, let alone communicate what his intent, motives, or possible defenses 
were. It is the female professor, Faroia Rassool, who finally verbalizes what David will not:  
We are again going around in circles, Mr. Chair. Yes, he says, he is 
guilty; but when we try to get specificity, all of a sudden it is not 
abuse of a young woman he is confessing to, just an impulse he 
could not resist, with no mention of the long history of exploitation 
of which this is part. That is why I say it is futile to go on debating 
with Professor Lurie. We must take his plea at face value and 
recommend accordingly. (Coetzee 53)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
To which David replies:  
 
‘I have said the words for you, now you want more, you want me 
to demonstrate their sincerity. That is preposterous. That is beyond 
the scope of the law. I have had enough. Let us go back to playing 
by the book. I plead guilty.’ (Coetzee 55) 
Even when presented with a prepared written statement by one of his colleagues who begs him to 
make a statement, David still refuses:  
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Manas, we went through the repentance business yesterday. I told 
you what I thought. I won’t do it. I appeared before an officially 
constituted tribunal, before a branch of the law. Before that secular 
tribunal I pleaded guilty, a secular plea. That plea should suffice. 
Repentance is neither here nor there. Repentance belongs to 
another world, to another universe of discourse. (Coetzee 58) 
David relies on legal principles and criminal justice procedures while rejecting the perceived 
moral policing being imposed by the university. He refuses to state any fact or admit any 
wrongdoing and instead invokes a myth—Eros, the Greek god of desire—as evidence of his 
incapacity. He claims to prefer criminal procedure to the university inquiry, without 
acknowledging that the very system he claims to prefer is in the business of producing truth, and 
he would be unable to plea-bargain and to negotiate his penalty without admitting the truth of his 
crimes. Like the university hearing, there was no opportunity to plea-bargain under the TRC; it 
was not necessary, since there was no mechanism for punishment. The TRC only required the 
confession, which was followed by absolution. Thus when Lucy later rejects David’s continuing 
insistence that she tell the “truth,” the hypocrisy is that much richer, as David protected himself 
by refusing to confess the truth and invoking a fiction in his defense.  
Coetzee creates undeniable parallels between the university committee and the TRC as 
quasi-legal bodies with limited punitive powers: “The body gathered here has no powers…[a]ll it 
can do is to make recommendations….This is not a trial but an inquiry,” David is informed at the 
outset (47). And that he, a white man, escapes criminal punishment for his abuse of a student’s 
human rights can be read as an analogy to the lack of criminal accountability for white 
perpetrators of human rights abuses under Apartheid, where as long as someone “confessed” and 
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publicly repented, they were absolved. David does not receive absolution only because he 
refused to provide just such a public confession.  
 
The Crime of Apathy  
 Jacqueline Rose, in her essay “Apathy and Accountability: The Challenge of South 
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission to the Intellectual in the Modern World,” 
discusses the necessity of apathy from average people living under Apartheid in order for the 
system to succeed in depriving one group of people their basic rights and dignity. She posits that 
in a system of oppression, “the silent complicity of its beneficiaries” is as necessary to sustaining 
the system as are overt political acts and human rights abuses (160). Yet apathy was not among 
the offenses the TRC considered, rendering those guilty of it who wished to confess unable to 
receive amnesty. Lucy’s silence following her rape is both an acknowledgment of and 
accounting for her own previous apathy, for which she realizes that “history is the only court” 
(Rose 160). 
Rose defines apathy as “a lack of necessary action in a time of crisis,” a phrase she 
borrows from an actual petition for amnesty that was submitted to the TRC. As part of its 
mandate, the TRC could grant amnesty to perpetrators who confessed to their actions or 
omissions, but only if they were deemed political in nature. One application submitted to the 
Commission by a woman who sought amnesty solely for her apathy, included the following 
statement:  
[A]s individuals can and should be held accountable by history for 
our lack of necessary action in times of crisis[,]…in exercising 
apathy rather than commitment, we allow(ed) others to sacrifice 
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their lives for the sake of our freedom and an increase in our 
standard of living. (Rose 159)  
Since amnesty could only be granted under the TRC for acts deemed to have been politically 
motivated, the woman’s request was denied. In focusing on this denial, Rose describes how the 
TRC’s focus on violent acts and criminal abuses led to its failure to “recognize the little 
perpetrator in each one of us” (133): “Inhuman political structures depend, for as long as they 
last, not just on the power of the oppressors and the silent complicity of the beneficiaries, but 
also on…those beneficiaries who may have hated the system but did not…do enough” (Rose 
160).  
Women were both the victims and the “little perpetrators” of apathy. It was intended that 
through the opportunity to publicly speak of the violations they were subjected to, victims would 
begin to regain their dignity. Yet of the 7128 applications for amnesty submitted to the TRC, 
only 56 were from women (Rose 163-64). Yet it flies in the face of reason to assume that women 
accounted for less than 1% of the perpetrators of acts that qualified for amnesty. The 
Commission even held a Special Hearing for Women intended to create a venue where women 
would feel safe and encouraged to speak of their own experiences; yet of the nearly 3000 pages 
of the final Report, the section dedicated to the Special Hearing for Women takes up only five 
pages: as Rose points out, women’s silence permeates the Report (164). It seems that in 
restricting amnesty to political actors, the TRC effectually ignored the way that apathy, and in 
particular the apathy of women, contributed to the “daily humiliations, inequalities and 
fundamental social injustice” that constituted life for black South Africans under Apartheid 
(Rose 162). Like the system that robbed so many women of their humanity, the solution robbed 
many of recourse while denying others the ability to confess and make amends:  
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To read the Report of the Commission is to be confronted on 
almost every page with how difficult it is to speak of atrocity, 
whether as a victim or perpetrator of the act, although the difficulty 
is radically different for each. It has been at the center of the 
Commission and the source of its greatest difficulty that 
language—in the words of Antjie Krog, the Afrikaans poet 
commissioned by the South Africa Broadcasting Association to 
report on the hearings—does not easily “bed” the truth. But we are 
presented here with the strange suggestion that the ways in which 
we do not implicate ourselves in the burdens of history might be 
something which it is even harder to talk about. (Rose 163) 
Under the TRC, spoken truth was the panacea; from truthful confession, all accountability 
flowed. That it could be so incomplete and one-sided calls into question the effectiveness of a 
system that relies on the production of truth as its engine: “The difficult relationship between 
truth and language also forces a no less crucial and fraught connection between the registers of 
justice and truth” (Rose 172).  Criminal justice was eliminated from the TRC as a possible 
punishment, and social justice through reparations could only be recommended. “To read the 
report is to watch accountability contract and expand, pulsing under the pressure of a set of 
crucial but barely sustainable distinctions. Accountability doesn’t stop. There is no upper 
limit….[T]he interstice between power and indifference or supportive agency is very very wide” 
(Rose 172).  
Lucy’s silence operates as an acknowledgment that the TRC’s effort to restore dignity to 
victims of Apartheid rest on its aim of “historical and collective justice” (Rose 170). She opts out 
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of seeking justice under one system (criminal) because she cannot be held accountable under 
another (the TRC).  
Don’t shout at me David. This is my life. I am the one who has to 
live here. What happened to me is my business, mine alone, not 
yours, and if there is one right I have it is the right not to be put on 
trial like this, not to have to justify myself—not to you, not to 
anyone else. (Coetzee133) 
Lucy does not seek justice as a victim when she herself could not be tried as a “little perpetrator” 
for her apathy during Apartheid. This by no means equates the wrongs; rather it highlights the 
inadequacies of two systems to bring about justice. Meanwhile the emphasis David places on her 
speaking the truth aligns him with those very institutions on which he claims to rely for justice. 
He remains woefully unaware of his own hypocrisy, that when faced with an accusation of 
sexual assault at his university, he refused to participate in the requested public confession which 
could have restored some dignity to his victim, and maybe even himself. By refusing to make a 
public statement of regret, David rejects both individual and historical accountability for his 
participation in the systemic abuse of power; his guilty plea is a feigned reliance on an individual 
reckoning that will never come for him just as it never came for many perpetrators of Apartheid. 
He has become both a public and private disgrace.  
David stands for what Rose describes as the “willed refusal to connect to the horrors 
going on around you” (175). His lack of empathy is further reflected in his understanding of 
Petrus:  
Petrus is a man of his generation. Doubtless Petrus has been 
through a lot, doubtless he has a story to tell. He would not mind 
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hearing Petrus’s story one day. But preferably not reduced to 
English. More and more he is convinced that English is an unfit 
medium for the truth of South Africa. Stretches of English code 
whole sentences long have thickened, lost their articulations, their 
articulateness, their articulatedness. Like a dinosaur expiring and 
settling in the mud, the language has stiffened. Pressed into the 
mould of English, Petrus’s story would come out arthritic, bygone. 
(Coetzee 117)  
David’s reference to Petrus’s life as a “story” that he would “not mind hearing” illustrates not 
only his limited interest in Petrus’ life experience, but also that he would not receive Petrus’s 
“story” with the same expectation of truth he expects his and Lucy’s respective testimony to be 
received. That English is an “unfit medium for the truth of South Africa” could not be more 
accurate, given that it is the language of colonizers; black school children in South Africa were 
murdered for protesting being taught in Afrikaans, the language of their oppressors. What David 
fails to realize is that it is not the language that is expiring, but the system that privileged it and 
its speakers. It’s he, not Petrus, who is arthritic, turning into a relic of white power, and unwilling 
to submit himself to the judgment of history. 
Michelle Kelly suggests that it is through David that the novel questions the reliance on 
rule of law in post-apartheid South Africa as a “pure, universal, rational. . . medium above all in 
which difference can be transacted” (163). She posits that when David says that “English is an 
unfit medium for the truth of South Africa,” it is “the dependence on truth and the rule of law to 
address and remedy human rights abuses” that Coetzee is calling into question (168).  
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Disgrace speaks to the post-apartheid challenge of creating or 
imagining popular acceptance of the law in a society where the 
law, historically, has been an instrument of governance, 
oppression, and disenfranchisement. (Kelly 171) 
It is true that David’s reliance on the rule of law remains steadfast throughout the novel, and by 
its close, Coetzee does not depict a future for David in society. It is as if his inability (or 
unwillingness) to recognize his privilege and participation in a legal system that has been an 
“instrument of oppression” means that he will be left behind. He clings to the old ways and old 
systems, and by the end he has literally lost everything—job, home, friends—and unlike Lucy, 
he envisions no future for himself: “I suspect it is too late for me. I’m just an old lag serving out 
my sentence. But you go ahead. You are well on the way” (Coetzee 216).  Lucy’s prospects at 
the novel’s end are bleak too. If the novel as a whole is speaking to the difficulty of imagining 
popular acceptance of the law, the character of Lucy represents it as an impossibility. Her 
decision to opt out of the law and of society as a whole represents that only a radical disruption 
of the existing social order and power dynamics will suffice.  
In her essay Human Rights, Social Justice, and J.M.Coetzee’s “Disgrace,” Elizabeth 
Anker summarizes how David’s stubborn reliance on the law highlights the inadequacies of the 
legal system in addressing human rights abuses. She frames her argument in the human rights 
discourse of individual autonomy when stating that the novel “suspends the expectation that the 
law will play a determinant role in advancing justice and effectuating social restoration due to its 
reliance on procedure, distortions and denials of non-dominant epistemologies, etc.” (Anker 
234). This aligns with Foucault’s point that when the will to truth is reinforced by the institutions 
of legal discourse, truth becomes the objective at the cost of its purported aim of justice.  
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By exposing both its oversights and its frequently violent 
intrusions, Disgrace suspends the expectation that the law plays a 
determinate role in advancing justice and effectuating social 
restoration. The novel interrogates the law for its excessive 
reliance on procedure, its distortions and denials of nondominant 
epistemologies, its dependence on the vagaries of disembodied 
principles, and its ready enlistment to serve inequitable causes. . . 
But despite its deficiencies, the law remains an object of passionate 
ambivalence throughout the novel, reflective of the common 
postcolonial equivocation toward the judicial system. (Anker 234) 
While concluding that the law is insufficient to ameliorate human rights abuses, Anker notes that 
by the conclusion of the novel, the characters are left with feelings of “longing and 
disappointment” toward the law (234). The same could be said for victims of Apartheid at the 
conclusion of the TRC. Lucy’s decision makes sense in this time and this place because as both a 
victim and little perpetrator of human rights abuse herself, she sees the inadequacy of the law 
where it only recognizes her individual rights and fails to take into account the collective 
complicity that allows a system like Apartheid to thrive (Anker 242) .  
 
The Burden of Staying On 
 Rose posits that Lucy takes on her assault “as the burden of atonement for the past 
wrongs of South Africa,” and I suggest that using a Foucauldian analysis, Lucy does something 
more. Her emotional or intellectual motivations are less important than what her decision to 
“stay on” represents in terms of power relations and truth telling. In refusing to speak of her rape, 
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in accepting Petrus’s offer of marriage and signing over the land and her child to him and his 
family, Lucy is not solely atoning for past crimes of South Africa. Through a negotiation for 
Petrus’s protection, she may stay in her home, or “stay on.” This is not to say that her proposal to 
Petrus serves a model for reparations, such as those suggested by Wole Soyinka in his essay  
“Reparations, Truth and Reconciliation,” although her transfer of land and paternity to Petrus can 
be viewed as an extreme form of voluntary reparations in a time and place where such a remedy 
could not be mandated: 
Propose the following. Say I accept his protection, say he can put 
out whatever story he likes about our relationship and I won’t 
contradict him. If he wants me to be known as his third wife, so be 
it. As his concubine, ditto. But then the child becomes his too. The 
child becomes part of his family. As for the land, say I will sign the 
land over to him as long as the house remains mine. I will become 
a tenant on his land.  
A bywoner. 
A bywoner. But the house remains mine, I repeat that. No one 
enters this house without my permission. Including him. And I 
keep the kennels. (Coetzee 204)  
Her proposition seems beyond the pale. But it must be considered in tandem with her question to 
David: “what if that is the price one has to pay for staying on” (158)? He interprets the “that” to 
mean her rape. But it could also represent the loss of dignity in the aftermath: the aftermath of a 
rape, perhaps; or the aftermath of Apartheid for those who had to “stay on” living their lives 
among the very same people whose complicity contributed to their loss dignity in the first place. 
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That is the penance of the “little perpetrator” in each person, and the only path Lucy sees forward 
after the TRC failed to offer a satisfactory way forward.  
By using her sexuality in this proposal, Coetzee allows Lucy to bargain for her own 
future economic (and sexual) security. She negotiates a place for herself as a wife of Petrus (in 
name), and a place for her future child in his family. She eschews individual criminal justice to 
alter the very power relations that created the conditions under which her attackers became men 
who “do rape” and creates a recourse not available in the controlling legal system. In this regard, 
the “truth” of her rape becomes a truth that lies outside of the current political, social and legal 
discourse, in Foucault’s “wild exteriority.”  In proposing this radical shift in power relations, 
Coetzee creates a space for Lucy to do more than simply “stay on.” It is worth noting that in 
some cultures, if a rapist married his victim, he could escape punishment for the crime, 
essentially exonerating himself with the marriage extending consent retroactively (Ferguson 92). 
“Marriage miscasts rape, so that marriage is a misunderstanding corrected, or rape rightly 
understood” (Ferguson 92). Lucy’s offer to become the third wife of a relative of her rapist can 
be seen as her rewriting her rape, creating a new truth in order to stay on. 
As a woman who pronounced herself dead after her rape, Lucy finds a narrow way to live 
again. In this space there is a recognition of the vast “interstice between power and indifferent 
agency,” and a nod to collective humaneness (Rose 173). “Ubuntu” is the Zulu term for 
humaneness, and was used by the TRC in stating its goal of restorative justice: “it can be 
understood as a notion of reciprocity: a human being is a human being through other human 
beings. One is, it follows, responsible for the other in a way that…favor[s] the collective” 
(Saunders 2005).  
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Or in the words of Desmond Tutu, “[a] person is a person because he recognizes others as 
persons” (Rose quoting Tutu 194).  It is this barrier of identification that Coetzee describes 
through Lucy’s account of her attacker’s hate for her, leaving her feeling as if she is dead, and 
her subsequent description of her attackers “like dogs in a pack.”1 It is a recognition of the 
dehumanising system of hatred and violence that has stripped people of their dignity and the 
inefficacy of the remedy offered for their future:  
[F]or nearly half a century…the warp and weft of their 
experience…defining their privilege and their disadvantage, their 
poverty and their wealth, their public and private lives and their 
very identity[,]…the system itself was evil, inhumane and 
degrading….[A]mongst its many crimes, perhaps its greatest was 
the power to humiliate, to denigrate and to remove the self-
confidence, self-esteem and dignity of its millions of victims. 
(TRC Report 34) 
“I do not yet know what will bring me back to life,” Lucy tells David (Coetzee 161). This 
represents how the evil embedded in the system of Apartheid—and importantly in which Lucy 
was complicit—it humiliated, denigrated, and stripped its victims of dignity. While the attack on 
Lucy and David seems gratuitous, Coetzee uses it to show how the effects of fifty years of 
inequality and humiliation have the same impact as a violent and brutal attack. It is a brutal 
position to take, that such violence is what causes one to finally consider how the barriers 
developed, how the system was built on stripping people of their dignity, and how the legal and 
 
1
 While Coetzee was criticized, perhaps rightly, for making a racist comparison of South 
Africans to dogs, I include it solely for its relevance as an analogy to the dehumanization under 
Apartheid and the subsequent failures of the TRC to address the same.  
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political systems failed both individual and the collective victims. Yet Coetzee does not offer a 
satisfying alternative. That Lucy can see no way forward other than to opt out of the current 
systems entirely is a bleak conclusion.  
The TRC tried to reinstate the dignity of daily life for the victims of Apartheid by 
recommending reparations, but it recognized this outcome was beyond its limited mandate: 
Ultimately, however, because the work of the Commission includes 
reconciliation, it needs to unleash a process that contributes to 
economic developments that redress past wrongs as a basis for 
promoting lasting reconciliation. This requires all those who 
benefited from Apartheid, not only those whom the Act defines as 
perpetrators, to commit themselves to the reconciliation process. 
(Rose 171).  
Yet because the TRC was unable to demand reparation; it could only recommend it. As Rose 
points out, with criminal justice for individuals off the table, and repartition for victims kicked 
down the road: “in the middle sits ‘restorative justice’, the foundation of the commission’s daily 
work, but only ‘if the emerging truth unleashes a social dynamic that includes redressing the 
suffering of victims will it meet the ideal of restorative justice’ (Rose 172). This is the social 
dynamic Lucy unleashes with her radical proposal:  
‘No, I’m not leaving. Go to Petrus and tell him what I have said. 
Tell him I give up the land. Tell him that he can have it, title deed 
and all. He will love that.’  
There is a pause between them. 
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‘How humiliating,’ he says finally. ‘Such high hopes, and to end 
like this.’ 
‘Yes, I agree, it is humiliating. But perhaps that is a good point to 
start from again. Perhaps that is what I must learn to accept. To 
start at ground level. With nothing. Not with nothing but. With 
nothing. No cards, no weapons, no property, no rights, no dignity.’ 
‘Like a dog.’ 
‘Yes, like a dog.’ (Coetzee 205). 
She surrenders her dignity, her identity, and even her impregnated body, to begin again, like a 
dog, alone with her dogs, in a new social order on the farm. Her shift from a state of apathy to a 
state of empathy is so complete that she displaces herself; her body literally becomes the 
involuntary host of another life which she will then give to Petrus. By tying her existence to 
Petrus’s, Lucy’s body becomes a metaphor for South Africa and the genealogy of a country 
emerging from decades of Apartheid. Her body is “overwritten with narratives of power,” and 
her “staying on” is a resistance to the interpretation of her rape out of the context of history: the 
history of Apartheid (Mardorossian 75). Rather than merely redistribute power, she transforms it 
in ways that fall outside the boundaries of the current social and political discourse. Her plan 
demands a redistribution of power which simply does not exist in this place, at this time. 
 
“Dogs Still Mean Something”  
It is nearly impossible to write about Disgrace without discussing dogs, as they play a 
vital symbolic role in the novel. Lucy is a caretaker of dogs prior to David’s arrival, keeping 
them as both a deterrent to intruders and a source of income: “There are the dogs. Dogs still 
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mean something. The more dogs, the more deterrence” (Coetzee 60 - 61). While staying with 
Lucy, David finds work euthanizing sick dogs at a local veterinary clinic, an enterprise that 
initially repels him. Dog imagery pervades the novel as well, from Lucy’s reference to her 
attackers as dogs, to her comparison of her position at the end of the novel as “humiliating…like 
a dog” (205). In The Law is a White Dog, Colin Dayan, writes that dogs—like ghosts—serve as 
“entry into the place where creatures both human and nonhuman are outside the community, on 
the borders of the known, beyond the pale of civilization…[in] a space haunted by exiled 
criminals, the insane, real and mythical beasts” (16). It is thus fitting that Coetzee’s two main 
characters become more intertwined with dogs as they drift further to the fringes of their 
respective communities.  
It is David’s exile from his university and his community in Cape Town that brings him 
to Lucy’s farm in the first place. When he first hears of Bev Shaw’s veterinary clinic, his 
response, a heavy-handed stroke on Coetzee’s part, cannot be overlooked: “I’m dubious Lucy. It 
sounds suspiciously like community service. It sounds like someone trying to make reparation 
for past misdeeds” (77). Yet by the novel’s end, David’s view of the clinic has evolved. Coetzee 
even chooses to close the novel with David euthanizing a dog to which he has become attached: 
‘Come,’ he says, bends, opens his arms. The dog wags its crippled 
rear, sniffs his face, licks his cheeks, his lips, his ears. He does 
nothing to stop it. ‘Come.’ 
Bearing him in his arms like a lamb, he re-enters the  surgery. ‘I 
thought you would save him for another week,’ says Bev  
Shaw. ‘Are you giving him up?’ 
‘Yes, I am giving him up.’ (220) 
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Dayan defines this as an act of grace (232). It could even be seen as an act of the very reparation 
David earlier criticized. And perhaps in closing with this image, Coetzee leaves the reader with 
the sliver of hope that David, who seems so devoid of empathy and unredeemable throughout the 
novel, is in fact starting his own path to reconciliation, his own “reparation for past misdeeds” 
(77). Whether these misdeeds might include his individual sexual assault and abuses of power, or 
his participation in the collective sins of Apartheid is unclear. Regardless he is at ground level, 
stripped of the dignity of daily life, with nothing, not even the dying dog about to leave his arms.  
 By the novel’s end, Lucy has gone from an owner of dogs as chattel to a woman living 
like a dog in a self-imposed exile. 
What does it mean in times of torture and dissembling to be like an 
animal? It all began with chattels. Their treatment helps us to 
understand the limits of cruelty. They are used as examples when 
humans need most to categorize, to dominate, to justify slavery, 
genocide, incarceration. The proximity between human and 
animals is sometimes tenuous. Boundaries are permeable, and 
taxonomies are necessary to ensure the order of things. But when 
the pressure is on to construct, legally and socially, degradation 
and inferiority, categories and terminologies get muddled. The 
hierarchies no longer hold. (Dayan 116) 
As discussed, the hierarchies in Disgrace—social, legal, economic—certainly do not hold. Dayan 
poses the question: “What is left of persons, once the law has finished with them?” (86). Coetzee 
answers this question quite clearly through Lucy: “They become like a dog” (Coetzee 205).  She 
transitions from an owner of dogs for commercial and security purposes, to living like a dog. She 
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has become aware that cruelty has no limits, that it is manifested in the shooting of dogs as well 
as apathy towards one’s neighbor. After all, “the interstice between power and indifferent or 
supportive agency is very very wide” (Rose 173).    
Moreover, if dogs in literature often represent an excess of grief, as Dayan suggests, then 
Disgrace contains embodied grief in spades (Dayan 20). There is so much grief, both historical 
and present, that David must literally carry it, bag it and dispose of it: “He gives these dog 
bodies, which might otherwise be broken, thrown away like refuse, another kind of burial, 
something that approaches holiness” when he places their corpses into garbage bags and loads 
them onto the truck (Dayan 232). Meanwhile excess grief is embodied through Lucy’s ultimate 
dog-like existence: she maintains no possessions or rights, lives in someone else’s house, and 
offers her baby to Petrus like one would a litter of puppies after birth. It is as if the excess grief 
of an entire nation of victims left without justice has been unleashed, and with no place to go, it 
has come home to roost within each of the little perpetrators who allowed it to flourish.  
 
Conclusion 
Disgrace illustrates how disassociated truth and justice are “in this place, at this time” of 
post-Aparthied South Africa. Lucy’s silence is both an act of contrition for the past sins of her 
country and a subversive act of power in which she shifts her relationship with Petrus (and 
tangentially with her rapists). The power is in the relationships between them; by refusing to 
define those relationships in the legal and social discourse of “this place” and “this time,” she 
gives rise to a possibility of truth and power outside the boundaries of the discourse. She creates 
a space for the technologies of power to constitute their positions differently from past models.  
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The novel disrupts the power relations among individual characters against the backdrop 
of a nation emerging from a period of extreme systemic oppression. Coetzee highlights the 
tenuous relationship between truth and justice through Lucy’s refusal to report her rape to the 
police and pursue a criminal justice remedy and offers an indictment of South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, which failed in its objective of providing justice to black South 
Africans in exchange for truth. Coetzee reveals the tenuous nature of the truth and the illusory 
promise of justice that it has come to represent in modern legal discourse as the characters 
grapple with legal systems that churn out statements of truth while denying victims the dignity of 
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